



FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

1125 K STREET N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463

THIS IS THE END OF MUR # 1803

Date Filmed 2/1/85 Camera No. --- 1

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FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

extra copies of letters - Routing Slips -
direction to/from docket - assignment sheet
Commission's Tally Sheet

The above-described material was removed from this file pursuant to the following exemption provided in the Freedom of Information Act; 5 U.S.C. Section 552(b):

- | | |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> (1) Classified Information | <input type="checkbox"/> (6) Personal privacy |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (2) Internal rules and practices | <input type="checkbox"/> (7) Investigatory files |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (3) Exempted by other statute | <input type="checkbox"/> (8) Banking Information |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (4) Trade secrets and commercial or financial information | <input type="checkbox"/> (9) Well Information (geographic or geophysical) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (5) Internal Documents | |

Signed

Walter L. ...

date

1/24/85

BEFORE THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

In the Matter of)
Ground Zero)

MUR 1803

CERTIFICATION

I, Marjorie W. Emmons, Secretary of the Federal Election Commission, do hereby certify that on January 4, 1985, the Commission decided by a vote of 5-0 to take the following actions in MUR 1803:

1. Find no reason to believe that Ground Zero violated 2 U.S.C. § 441b and 2 U.S.C. § 441d, provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act, as amended.
2. Approve the letters attached to the First General Counsel's Report signed January 2, 1985.
3. Close the file.

Commissioners Elliott, Harris, McDonald, McGarry and Reiche voted affirmatively in this matter; Commissioner Aikens did not cast a vote.

Attest:

1-7-85

Date

Marjorie W. Emmons

Marjorie W. Emmons
Secretary of the Commission

Received in Office of Commission Secretary:
Circulated on 48 hour tally basis:

1-2-85, 12:49
1-2-85, 4:00

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FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463

January 8, 1985

John T. Dolan
National Conservative Political
Action Committee
1001 Prince Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22314

RE: MUR 1803
Ground Zero


Dear Mr. Dolan:

The Federal Election Commission has reviewed the allegations of your complaint dated September 28, 1984 and determined that on the basis of the information provided in your complaint there is no reason to believe that a violation of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended, ("the Act") has been committed. Accordingly, the Commission has decided to close the file in this matter. The Federal Election Campaign Act allows a complainant to seek judicial review of the Commission's dismissal of this action. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8).

Should additional information come to your attention which you believe establishes a violation of the Act, you may file a complaint pursuant to the requirements set forth in 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(1) and 11 C.F.R. § 111.4.

Sincerely,

Charles N. Steele
General Counsel

BY: 
Kenneth A. Gross
Associate General Counsel

Enclosure
General Counsel's Report

35040512061



FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463

January 8, 1985

Ground Zero
c/o Roger C. Molander
2335 King Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007

RE: MUR 1803
Ground Zero

Dear Mr. Molander:

On October 12, 1984, the Commission notified you of a complaint alleging violations of certain sections of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended.

The Commission, on January 4, 1985, determined that on the basis of the information in the complaint, there is no reason to believe that a violation of any statute within its jurisdiction has been committed. Accordingly, the Commission closed its file in this matter. This matter will become a part of the public record within 30 days.

Sincerely,

Charles N. Steele
General Counsel

BY: Kenneth A. Gross
Associate General Counsel

cc: Earl A. Molander

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FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463

MEMORANDUM

TO: Office of the Commission Secretary
FROM: Office of General Counsel *OK*
DATE: January 2, 1985
SUBJECT: MUR 1803 - First General Counsel's Report

The attached is submitted as an Agenda document
for the Commission Meeting of _____
Open Session _____
Closed Session _____

CIRCULATIONS

48 Hour Tally Vote	[X]
Sensitive	[X]
Non-Sensitive	[]
24 Hour No Objection	[]
Sensitive	[]
Non-Sensitive	[]
Information	[]
Sensitive	[]
Non-Sensitive	[]
Other	[]

DISTRIBUTION

Compliance	[X]
Audit Matters	[]
Litigation	[]
Closed MUR Letters	[]
Status Sheets	[]
Advisory Opinions	[]
Other (see distribution below)	[]

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SENSITIVE

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
1325 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20463

FIRST GENERAL COUNSEL'S REPORT

DATE AND TIME OF
TRANSMITTAL BY OGC
TO THE COMMISSION: 1/2/85-12:50

MUR 1803
DATE COMPLAINT RECEIVED
BY OGC: October 5, 1984
DATE OF NOTIFICATION TO
RESPONDENT: October 12, 1984
STAFF MEMBER: Matt Gerson

COMPLAINANT'S NAME: National Conservative Political Action
Committee
John 'Terry' Dolan

RESPONDENT'S NAME: Ground Zero

RELEVANT STATUTES: 2 U.S.C. § 431(8) (A) (i)
2 U.S.C. § 441b
2 U.S.C. § 441d
11 C.F.R. § 110.11(a) (1)
11 C.F.R. § 114.3(a) (1)
AO 1984-14

RELEVANT CASES: Miller v. American Telephone and Telegraph
Company, 507 F.2d 758 (3d. Cir. 1974).
United States v. United Automobile Workers,
352 U.S. 567 (1957)

INTERNAL REPORTS CHECKED: Public Records

FEDERAL AGENCIES CHECKED: None

SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS

On October 5, 1984, the Federal Election Commission received from the National Conservative Political Action Committee (hereinafter "NCPAC") a complaint alleging that Ground Zero (hereinafter "GZ") violated 2 U.S.C. § 441d by not including a disclaimer statement on a direct mailer that allegedly advocated Ronald Reagan's defeat. By its reference to AO 1984-14, NCPAC has raised the question of whether GZ violated 2 U.S.C. 441b by making expenditures in connection with a federal election and distributing partisan material beyond the class of people that a

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corporation may contact lawfully.

On November 27, 1984, the General Counsel's Office received a telephone call from a Ground Zero representative. The representative called from Oregon and stated that the District of Columbia Not-for-Profit corporation currently exists primarily as a legal entity. The complaint was mailed to the District of Columbia address listed on Ground Zero's stationery on October 12, 1984, forwarded to Oregon, and claimed by the representative on November 26, 1984. Ground Zero responded on December 14, 1984. See Attachment 1.

II. FACTUAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS

Ground Zero is an organization concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It considers itself a "deliberately nonpartisan/non-advocacy program" that seeks to inform the citizenry about the nation's policies relating to nuclear war.

NCPAC alleges that the GZ direct mailer should have contained a disclaimer statement. 2 U.S.C. § 441d requires that

whenever any person makes an expenditure for the purpose of financing communications expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, or solicits any contribution through any ... direct mailing ...

the communication must indicate who paid for it, and where required, who authorized such communication. The Commission's regulations promulgated pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a) specify

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that a sponsor's identification ("disclaimer") must

be presented in a clear and conspicuous manner to give the reader, observer or listener adequate notice of the identity of the persons who paid for ... the communication. 11 C.F.R. Section 110.11(a)(1).

Thus, the issues under 2 U.S.C. 441d and 11 C.F.R. § 110.11(a)(1) are: (1) whether the communication expressly advocated Ronald Reagan's defeat, or (2) whether the communication solicited contributions for the purpose of influencing a federal election. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i). The answers to both these questions rely on the Commission's interpretation of the language GZ used in its direct mailing.

Ground Zero's letter never mentions Ronald Reagan or any candidate by name. It refers to the nation's nuclear policy under, "a succession of U.S. presidents." GZ believes the world is confronting a dangerous situation as a result of nuclear proliferation -- "Helping the 'people' understand the realities of the nuclear war issue is what Ground Zero is about." GZ's letter refers to the 1984 elections in the following ways:

(GZ) requires your full support if we are to reach enough Americans to make a difference when it really counts: in the 1984 presidential elections.

Make our democratic system responsive.

We will make sure that the 1984 election campaign is an experience unprecedented in American electoral history ... At every campaign stop, candidates will be challenged on all aspects of their program to prevent nuclear war.

Every serious presidential candidate will discover that political success depends on a willingness to describe a thoughtful and coherent comprehensive national strategy for preventing nuclear war. See Attachment 2.

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It is of primary importance that there is no express advocacy in the direct mailer. In Buckley, the Supreme Court held that in order for communications to be considered express advocacy they must be unambiguously related to the campaign of a particular federal candidate and must expressly advocate one's election or defeat with terms such as "vote for", "elect", "vote against", and "defeat". In the instant case, the solicitation's lack of reference to Reagan's candidacy and lack of a message expressly advocating Reagan's defeat places the solicitation outside the strictures of 2 U.S.C. § 441d in that regard.

In addition, because the General Counsel is of the opinion that the communication did not solicit contributions for the purpose of influencing a federal election, it is not governed by 2 U.S.C. § 441d on that basis. The purpose was to generate funds to sustain GZ's effort at sharing its views with the public. Since, as previously established, nothing in these communications could be read as constituting any sort of electioneering, such solicitations could not be said to have been for the purpose of influencing a Federal election.

NCPAC has raised the possibility of a 2 U.S.C. § 441b violation through its reference to AO 1984-14.^{1/} Ground Zero is a Not-for-Profit corporation governed by District of Columbia law

^{1/} In AO 1984-14, the Commission ruled that a Not-for-Profit membership organization could distribute to the general public a voter guide compiling voting records of candidates and advocating positions on issues, so long as it did not favor one candidate or political party over another. The compilation was lawful because the language did not evince, "an election-influencing purpose," i.e. noting that a certain candidate is easier to convince when he's looking for votes than after he's safely in office.

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
and may not make an expenditure in connection with a federal election nor make partisan communications to non-members. It is the General Counsel's view that GZ's expenditures were not in connection with the President's reelection campaign since there is no nexus between the mailings and a federal election. See Miller v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company, 507 F.2d 758 (1974). Indeed, GZ makes no reference to any individual's federal campaign in its mailing. Instead, it emphasizes the need for the electorate to understand America's policies. There is no "active electioneering" but only a discussion of the dangerous situation the world is confronting. See United States v. United Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567 (1957). Finally, because the mailer contains only legislative and issue advocacy, it is not partisan material and may be distributed beyond the statutory restricted class.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Find no reason to believe that Ground Zero violated 2 U.S.C. § 441b and 2 U.S.C. § 441d, provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act, as amended.
2. Approve the attached letters.
3. Close the file.

Charles N. Steele
General Counsel

BY:


Kenneth A. Gross
Associate General Counsel


Date June 21, 1985

Attachments

1. Ground Zero's response
2. Ground Zero's direct mailer
3. Letter to respondent
4. Letter to complainant

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GROUND ZERO

RECEIVED AT THE FEC
GCC#5954
DEC 14 8:56

December 12, 1984

Mr. Matthew Gerson
Federal Election Commission
Washington, DC 20463

In Re: MYR1803

Dear Mr. Gerson:

As I explained to you on the phone, the enclosure reached me in Portland, Oregon, on November 26, 1984. It was forwarded from the address indicated. The Washington, D.C., office of Ground Zero has been closed, and I am handling its affairs.

I have forwarded copies to Roger Molander and Marc E. Miller, Chairman of the Ground Zero Board of Directors. They are still in Washington, D.C. It reached them on December 1, 1984. On behalf of Ground Zero, and acting at their direction, I hereby assert that the charges against Ground Zero are without foundation and urge that they be dismissed.

I have examined carefully the fund-raising appeal letter on which the NCPAC complaint is based. Nowhere do I see the slightest evidence to support the charges in paragraph 4 of the NCPAC letter dated September 28, 1984.

Nor is this a "voter guide" as mentioned in paragraph 5 of that letter. Even if it could be construed as such, nowhere does it "imply a right or wrong answer or a weak record." In fact, no mention is made of President Reagan in the entire four pages of the Roger Molander letter.

In further support of the assertion that the charges should be dismissed, please note page 4, paragraph 6, of the letter which emphasizes the uniform and even treatment of the nuclear war issue, which has been our long-standing guide. In fact, until this NCPAC charge, our "...deliberately nonpartisan/non-advocacy program..." has never been challenged.

The letter is an invocation to the recipient to (1) involve him/herself in the political process in order to participate in decision-making in those decisions that will affect his/her own future, but to do so from a position of greater information than he/she now possesses; and (2) to contribute to an organization that will educate others to do the same.

This letter was mailed to potential contributors in the spring of 1984. The last mail date was early in March, 1984, at a time when only the Democratic Presidential nomination was contested.

In sum, there are no grounds for the charges and we urge immediate dismissal.

We have deferred a decision on the matter of appointing a general counsel, not only because we do not believe the charges against Ground Zero are serious enough to warrant such a move, but also because the organization is without the resources to pay one.

Sincerely,


Earl A. Molander

for
GROUND ZERO
Post Office Box 19329
Portland, Oregon 97209

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806 15th Street, N.W.,



Washington, D.C. 20005

Dear Friend,

Do you think that going from 0 to 50,000 nuclear weapons in the world in 37 years is a human success story?

Do you think that expansion of the "Nuclear Club" from a half dozen nations today to perhaps twenty by the end of the century will make you and your family safer?

Do you think that one summit meeting between the presidents of the United States and the Soviet Union in the last eight years gives us much hope for reigning in the nuclear arms race?

Neither do I.

Do you think that bringing the energy, common sense, and "can-do" attitude of the American people to bear on the problem of nuclear war will help us -- as a nation and as the dominant species on this planet -- to find a new path away from the devastation of nuclear war?

So do I.

So would Daniel Webster, were he still around. That great American statesman rightly proclaimed:

Nothing will ruin the country if the people themselves undertake its safety, and nothing can save it if they leave it in any hands but their own.

The terrible jeopardy in which we find our nation today is unquestionably in part the result of "the people" -- the sensible citizens of the United States -- having left their security exclusively in the hands of others for far too long.

... in the hands of a succession of U.S. presidents who promised us safety and then yielded to the conventional wisdom of their appointed advisors.

... in the hands, therefore, of a narrow community of national security experts whose unquestioning adherence to the centuries-old strategy of "if you hit me, you're gonna be sorry" has led us into a game of suicidal leapfrog with the Russians (whose experts are no more far-sighted than our own).

As you probably suspect, there is no single simple route out of our current dilemma -- but if American citizens will apply their survival instinct and common sense, this nation can

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forge a fundamentally new path away from the precipice of nuclear war.

In Webster's own words, we the people must take our safety back into our own hands after nearly four decades. Call it the Second American Revolution.

With your help, Ground Zero can make it happen. We have a concrete, well thought-out program for turning this nation -- and this whole beleaguered planet -- away from nuclear war.

During the seven years I worked on strategic nuclear weapons policy on the National Security Council staff at the White House, I saw first-hand how haphazardly critical national policies -- policies which affect the survival of my children -- are made.

That's why I founded Ground Zero.

I saw what was missing in the Government's process for setting policies relating to nuclear war, and I saw that the path to safety lies in making our American democracy work as it was meant to.

Thomas Jefferson wrote the prescription:

I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not take it from them, but to inform their discretion by education.

The language is quaint, but the message is pure Nuclear Age. This architect of the first American Revolution put his confidence in the innate wisdom of the broad spectrum of Americans. He felt that once we understand the realities of a problem, our good sense will lead us to a consensus on a solution -- a solution that will work.

I agree. Helping "the people" understand the realities of the nuclear war issue is what Ground Zero is about. It is a critical role, and one that requires your full support if we are to reach enough Americans to make a difference when it really counts: in the 1984 presidential elections.

Even as I write, Ground Zero activists are hard at work in the early primary states, empowering citizens to take their safety back into their own hands. This critical effort--helping people master the nuclear war issue and make our democratic system responsive-- will continue across the country right through Election Day.

Between the program our nationwide grassroots network is running with and our new book, HOPE: FACING THE MUSIC ON NUCLEAR WAR IN THE 1984 ELECTIONS, we will make sure that the 1984 election campaign is an experience unprecedented in American electoral history.

At every campaign stop, candidates will be challenged on all aspects of their program to prevent nuclear war--including their

(to the next page, please)

approach to U.S.-Soviet relations, the overriding issue in reducing the threat of a "day after"--by people who know enough to ask tough questions and demand concrete, straightforward answers.

No evasion, no inconsistency, no simplistic "panacea," no glib promise, no unrealistic proposal will go unchallenged.

Every serious presidential candidate will discover that political success depends on a willingness to describe a thoughtful and coherent comprehensive national strategy for preventing nuclear war.

In other words, the 1984 presidential election can be made a virtual citizens' referendum on the best approach to preventing nuclear war.

You probably think that goal sounds pretty ambitious, but if you will join us in this most important of human enterprises, we can make it happen.

We have to make it happen. If 1984 is "business as usual" in American politics -- with empty rhetoric and the manipulation of issues by the candidates -- we are going to end up with nuclear war policy as usual for four more years.

You might wonder at this point what makes Ground Zero think we can bring the number and diversity of Americans to confront this issue that will make the critical difference in 1984.

Well, here's what we've accomplished so far:

- o In 1982, we got over a million Americans to actively "take on" the nuclear war issue through direct participation in Ground Zero Week educational events in over 650 cities and towns nationwide. The media responded with substantive coverage of the issue, as well as the Week, that helped educate at least 50 million more citizens.
- o Our 1982 primer, NUCLEAR WAR: WHAT'S IN IT FOR YOU?, has sold well over 300,000 copies and is still going strong.
- o Church, civic, high school, college, and ad hoc groups in over 2,000 U.S. communities played our innovative Firebreaks War/Peace Game in 1983. Participants gained a solid understanding of how--and how easily--an international crisis could slide into nuclear conflict. More important, they learned what kinds of U.S. actions and policies can reduce the threat of nuclear war.
- o Our 1983 primer, WHAT ABOUT THE RUSSIANS--AND NUCLEAR WAR?, and a pilot "What about the Russians?" Week educational project confirmed that Americans from across the political spectrum are ready, willing, and able to take on the question of how to deal with the Soviet Union. (Now, if we can only get the presidential candidates to do the same....).
- o On November 21, 1983, Ground Zero's Viewing Guide helped millions of Americans turn the trauma of "The Day After" into a positive learning experience on the prevention of nuclear war.

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And that, as they say, is just for starters.

The 1984 election campaign will be a critical test of our ability to decide, as a nation, which strategies for survival in the Nuclear Age are most promising. To make those decisions thoughtfully--and we can't afford to do otherwise--we must demand that each of the candidates submit for our examination a concrete, coherent, and comprehensive set of policies for preventing nuclear war.

Orchestrating that demand, and giving it substance and structure, are the goals of Ground Zero's major 1984 programs.

- o Aggressive promotion of our revised Firebreaks War/Peace Game is bringing a wide variety of groups into the nuclear war issue with a vehicle that is fascinating as well as educational.
- o The insights gained in the game will prepare citizens to join our activists in a full range of 1984 election projects--voter and media briefings on the "firebreak" issues, candidate forums, and Ground Zero's national grassroots Election Connection.

All these projects are aimed at forming a large and diverse "critical mass" of Americans who demand straight talk from the candidates before they vote.

Let's put it this way: A full-scale nuclear war today would kill at least 140,000,000 Americans--Republicans and Democrats, liberals and conservatives, independents and people who never vote at all. That makes preventing nuclear war everybody's business.

So, Ground Zero's deliberately nonpartisan/non-advocacy program is also everybody's business. As millions of Americans are discovering, the facts of nuclear war speak persuasively for themselves.

But make no mistake. What we are talking about is indeed a revolution--millions upon millions of citizens saying, in effect, "I'm scared, and 1984 is the year I help turn things around."

This revolution is going to take everyone's help, and right now I am asking for yours. Ground Zero will make a difference this year--how big a difference will depend in part on your support.

Sincerely,

Roger G. Molander
Roger G. Molander
Executive Director

P.S. Given Ground Zero's education mission, I would be remiss in seeking your support without giving you an opportunity to learn more about the nuclear war issue yourself. I am pleased, therefore, to offer our primer, NUCLEAR WAR: WHAT'S IN IT FOR YOU? to all contributors of \$25 or more.

I think you'll find this book readable, informative and very helpful in ordering the welter of facts associated with the nuclear war issue. By supporting Ground Zero and becoming especially well informed on the issue, you'll be contributing to the prevention of nuclear war in two critical ways. Please act now.

NUCLEAR, From Page B1

I recall one Saturday a colleague came into the think tank office with his wife to find me sketching different-colored pins — representing different-sized weapons — into a map of the Soviet Union. Add a pink pin for Minsk — another 200,000 dead. My colleague's wife was horrified. But when the pin went into Minsk or Moscow, I didn't see people weeping or children playing. I assumed that someone above me in the system thought about these things. I just stuck in the pins.

In 1980, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) began, and I found myself trying to find the combinations of weapons limitations and verification provisions that would be acceptable to us and our allies as well as to the places where the pins were being stuck. At first I thought the problem looked easy to me. But an older colleague told me I had a lot to learn. He was, of course, correct.

Within a month I had met the first of a small but not uncharismatic community of people who violently opposed SALT for a simple reason: It might keep America from developing a first-strike capability against the Soviet Union. I'll never forget being lectured by an Air Force colonel about how we should have "talked" the Soviets in the late 1940s before they got The Bomb. I was told that if SALT would go away, we'd soon have the capability to make them again — and this time we'd use it.

As the SALT negotiations began in earnest, I day into studies at the think tank for the Pentagon — and immediately came face to face with the ultimate questions of the nuclear war trade: How much is enough? What is the "threshold of pain" for the Soviet decision-makers? What level of destruction will deter Soviet attack? Is it measured in industrial capacity? In war machines? In Soviet citizenry? In some arcane combination of these and other factors which a careful reading of Russian history and of recent articles in Red Star would divine?

My idea of progress was complete. The scientist — whose main interest in graduate school was trying to obtain commercially useful energy from controlled fusion — had become the policy analyst playing nuclear war. The policy analyst went to the White House.

□ □

I was at the White House's National Security Council only a few months when it was time for a SALT negotiating session to begin in Geneva. One of Secretary of State Kissinger's division heads asked me to draft a set of instructions for the American delegation. I asked what to put in the instructions — and was told just to do a draft on my own, with one cover memo to Kissinger and another from Kissinger to the president.

Three days later I got the package and the instructions back. The person who had asked for the draft had not changed a word. Nor had Kissinger. Nor had the president. The instructions were on their way to Geneva. I swallowed hard.

Those people above me who were supposed to be thinking about the Big Questions were

relying on me to think about these things. I was to make decisions in the nuclear war trade, not just stick in pins. So I began to think about many things.

I thought about the fact that nobody else around the White House seemed to understand nuclear war issues better than I did; knowing my limitations, that did not reassure me. I thought about the organizational chaos at the White House, the haphazard way decisions often were reached. I thought about the minimum amount of time the president had to spend on nuclear war issues, his ultimate responsibility. I thought about the former presidential science adviser, similarly struck by the way major decisions are made, who asked, "Where are the guys-up?"

His comment is apt. There is a good deal of childish behavior in the White House, including temper tantrums. The last place I expected to find adults losing control of themselves was in White House rooms with nuclear war planners. But there the tantrums were — directed at officials of other countries, at briefing books, at staff, at other high U.S. officials, at almost anything you can think of. I had hoped that the White House's nuclear war business was in the hands of people who were rational and calm under pressure. I was learning.

In time I learned to live with all of this. But to friends — who asked questions like "Not going to get blown up soon, are we?" — I considered that it was the ultimate example of "in the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king." Many thought I was joking. I wasn't.

As the shock of these experiences wore off, I joined with some of the most dedicated people I have ever met in trying to help the president perform the hardest job in the world. I watched these presidents who were deeply concerned about the problem of preventing nuclear war leave the White House with a sense of frustration. Each sought to leave the American people with a legacy of security with respect to nuclear war, a confidence that nuclear war would not happen. Each failed.

I felt that came some of frustration and failure, especially in early 1980, when the struggle to save SALT II and the work of three administrations ended with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. I had expected to spend the first few months of 1980 carrying the case for the treaty — "modest, but useful," in the words of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — to the Senate floor. I knew it would be a real challenge: I had discovered that most of the members on the Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees — those making critical decisions, to say nothing of endless speeches — lacked even a rudimentary understanding of the nuclear war business.

When SALT II was defeated, I had some time to ponder how we had gotten ourselves into the awful mess we were in.

□ □

The factor that stood out in my mind was

Start Worrying and Hate the Bomb

the seeming lack of understanding of just how great the chance of nuclear war really was.

I had seen how the White House and the so-called chain of command operated — and assumed the Russians were probably worse. I knew how poorly we understood the Russians — and how poorly they understood us. I could see the rising problem of nuclear proliferation vastly increasing the risk of super-power confrontation.

Adding it all up was unsettling. There was altogether too much opportunity for machine error, for human error, for errors in judgment. Nuclear war could occur far more easily than people in the White House, in Congress and in the country at large seemed to realize.

In Thomas Pynchon's prize-winning novel "Gravity's Rainbow," two of the major figures, a statistician and a Pavlovian psychologist, debate the driving forces behind human events. The statistician claims it's mostly random and unpredictable — a lot of balls bouncing off each other governed primarily by the laws of probability. The Pavlovian argues for a world dominated by cause and effect, stimulus and response. I vote with the statistician.

If nuclear war comes and any historians survive, they will marvel at the role of chance in its genesis, its escalation, its grim conclusion.

Some chance events — which have taken us closer to the brink than is realized — have of course already occurred. There was the mid-1980s incident in which U.S. radar mistook the rising of the moon for a missile attack. There was the 1979 mishap in which a computer with a practice Soviet missile at-

tack tape on it was accidentally introduced into an operating missile warning system. There was the 1980 accident in which a microchip failed in a computer at Strategic Air Command headquarters in Omaha and the B52s almost took off.

These unintended happenings can be multiplied by presumed mishaps on the Soviet side and by additional mistakes in other nations which have acquired, or are in the process of acquiring, nuclear weapons. It is by no means inconceivable that next time, rather than on a calm day when we and the Soviets are merely at our normal levels of enmity, a false alarm will occur in an atmosphere of crisis, with somebody suddenly heading for the Hot Line and trying to explain that it was just a mistake.

Ah, yes, the Hot Line. How many people know that it's a slow teletype machine, and that its use suffers from the usual problem of getting a good translation? I had witnessed two incidents in the SALT negotiations in which the United States and the Soviet Union had profoundly misunderstood each other in this fashion.

The first was at Vladivostok in 1974, when President Ford and Secretary Kissinger had come home in triumph with an agreement that was found to be an agreement at all when the sides tried to write it down in agreed language. A similar incident took place in the early months of the Carter administration, when an agreement on limiting new types of ICBMs evaporated into thin air over a language disagreement.

What if one of these "misunderstandings" took place in a crisis as the sides tried to control further escalation, rather than in the midst of a seven-year negotiation? In the nuclear war business, we cannot afford to lose anything in the translation.

It was also chance that these thoughts coincided with the birth of my second child.

There's something in the birth of a child — or the death of a loved one — that is a reminder of both the miracle and the fragility of life. Now there she was, a new person, a new being, demanding the right to live, to find out "why she came." And here I was, thinking of the risks of nuclear war.

I held forth on all this to a friend late one night when most sensible people have gone home or to bed. I railed away at the absurdity of the situation we Americans found ourselves in — living in an imperfect world with imperfect machines and imperfect people making decisions on subjects they only partially understood. Something had to be done.

Clearly, at the heart of the problem is that the public has scarcely any reliable information with which to develop thoughtful opinions about American nuclear policy. Policy makers, therefore, have little serious sense of public opinion to guide them.

Sure, there are polls on the nuclear ques-

tion. But nowhere do these polls tell us about the difficult decisions and trade-offs involved. We know from polls, for example, that two-thirds of the nation wants to pursue arms control with the Soviet Union — and that at the same time two-thirds doesn't trust the Russians to adhere to such accords. Do Americans, therefore, want arms control negotiations or not? The polls, in their simplicity, have been part of the problem.

A larger part of the problem is that no effort has been made by the government to maintain public concern and understanding about the fundamental questions of nuclear war. Perhaps this is understandable. What president is going to send a message to the nation that he and his colleagues are losing their grip on the nuclear war issue? Public interest groups have made some effort, but they are small, uncoordinated, often suspected of being "soft-headed lefties," and expend most of their energy in Washington.

It was clear that something was wrong, that the link between policymakers in Washington and the people we served was far too weak. We didn't understand their fears and frustrations; they didn't understand the complicated bases of our decisions. Only by providing careful and thorough information to public and to officials can we avoid the hysteria we often find on both the extreme left and right.

My interest in doing something about all this waned as daily life took over again — until chance intervened once more in the form of the abortive attempt to rescue the American hostages held in Iran in April 1980.


The day after the raid, as we waited to see how the Iranians would react and what fate held in store for the hostages, I encountered a friend, a general, in the halls of the Old Executive Office Building. We both knew all too well that the favorite Pentagon war game scenario for the start of World War III was a crisis in Iran. Now we had one. What if the Iranians killed the hostages? What would the Russians do if we retaliated?

We talked about the uncertainties, and as the conversation drew to a close, he said, "You know, I called my kids last night." He hesitated and then continued, "I never call my kids." His kids were grown up, and I knew what he was saying: Was this it?

The final chance event that confirmed my determination to help correct our flaws involved another military officer. It happened at a meeting in the Pentagon when a Navy captain offered the view that people in this country and Europe were getting much too excited about the consequences of nuclear war. He argued that people were "talking as if nuclear war would be the end of the world when, in fact, only 500 million people would be killed."

Only 500 million people. I remember repeating it to myself. Only 500 million people.

Then he went on to argue that within a generation, genetic engineering would make people immune to radiation. I reached for my hat, suddenly knowing how Woody Allen is in "Anne Hall" when he excused himself from a conversation with the plea that he had "an appointment back on planet Earth."



Roger Malander

How I Learned to Start Worrying and Hate the Bomb

By Roger Molander

I WAS INTRODUCED to nuclear war in the mid-1950s, hiding under my school desk during civil defense drills, hoping the Russian bombers would never come. It never crossed my mind then that I would someday be working on nuclear strategy at the White House, hoping still that nuclear war would never come — and realizing how easily it might.

I came to Washington in the 1960s to work for a defense think tank, and within a few months I found myself at an Albuquerque conference, sitting in a Holiday Inn bar listening to war stories. Nuclear war stories. That's part of the nuclear trade — making fun of yourselves, trying to find ways not to take yourself too seriously, even having a good time now and then.

My favorite tale that night was about Rarotonga, a dreamy island in the South Pacific. For several months in the early 1960s it was an outpost for a two-man crew manning a radar that observed atmospheric weapons tests, clearly a hardship assignment. The men's only contact with civilization was a weekly supply plane, which kept breaking down on the island.

In fact, it broke down so often that the regional military commander sent a special mission force to find out what was up. The special mission discovered that Rarotonga was a Polynesian paradise with lush tropical fruits and affectionate maidens straight out of a Gauguin painting. Rarotonga was taken off the hardship duty list.

Within a year or so, my think-tank studies of weapons effects gave way to studies of the weapons themselves and to communications systems and missile warning systems. Then came nuclear "exchange" calculations: our missiles against their missiles, their missiles against our bombers, their subs against our bombers — endless combinations.

There were no people involved in these "exchanges," only calculations. It was a curious fiction, never discussing the humans at the military installations or the industries or the cities. I guess that made it easier on the targeters in Omaha, the people there in charge of launching the missiles or the bombers, and the analysts like me.

See NUCLEAR, Page D5

Roger Molander, former nuclear strategist for the White House's National Security Council, now is executive director of "Ground Zero," a nuclear war education project.



By Hans Mordeson - The Washington Post

If you think nuclear war-related decisions "at the top" are made by national mature "grown-ups," I suggest you read this tale of my experience. R.M.

In nuclear jargon, Ground Zero is the point where a nuclear weapon is detonated.

In survival jargon, it marks a beginning.

We should, we must, make it the first step on the way back from the edge.

—Judy Mann
The Washington Post

Dear Roger Molander:

I agree that "the experts" have already brought us too close to the brink of nuclear war. Count me in for the Second American Revolution. I want to support Ground Zero's critical efforts to help the citizens of this nation find a path away from nuclear war. Enclosed is my tax-deductible contribution to Ground Zero.

☐ \$15

☒ \$25

☐ \$50

☐ \$100

☐ Other \$ _____

*For membership contributions of \$25 or more Ground Zero will send you NUCLEAR WAR: WHAT'S IN IT FOR YOU?, an essential book for every concerned American who wants the clear, unbiased facts about nuclear war.

IN A DEMOCRACY, PREVENTING NUCLEAR WAR IS *EVERYBODY'S* BUSINESS

I would also like to get involved in Ground Zero activities in my community. Please send me information on:

☐ FIREBREAKS II: A War-Peace Game

☐ Ground Zero's program for making the 1984 presidential election a virtual citizens referendum on a comprehensive U.S. strategy for preventing nuclear war.

Home Area Code/Phone Number


Work Area Code/Phone Number

GROUND ZERO • 806 15th Street, N.W., Suite 421 • Washington, D.C. 20005


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IMPORTANT
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IN THE
UNITED STATES



BUSINESS REPLY MAIL
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POSTAGE WILL BE PAID BY ADDRESSEE

GROUND ZERO
806 15th Street, N.W., Suite 421
Washington, D.C. 20005

GROUND ZERO

RECEIVED AT THE FEC

GCC#5954

DEC 14 AB: 10

December 12, 1984

Mr. Matthew Gerson
Federal Election Commission
Washington, DC 20463

In Re: MYR1803

Dear Mr. Gerson:

As I explained to you on the phone, the enclosure reached me in Portland, Oregon, on November 26, 1984. It was forwarded from the address indicated. The Washington, D.C., office of Ground Zero has been closed, and I am handling its affairs.

I have forwarded copies to Roger Molander and Marc E. Miller, Chairman of the Ground Zero Board of Directors. They are still in Washington, D.C. It reached them on December 1, 1984. On behalf of Ground Zero, and acting at their direction, I hereby assert that the charges against Ground Zero are without foundation and urge that they be dismissed.

I have examined carefully the fund-raising appeal letter on which the NCPAC complaint is based. Nowhere do I see the slightest evidence to support the charges in paragraph 4 of the NCPAC letter dated September 28, 1984.

Nor is this a "voter guide" as mentioned in paragraph 5 of that letter. Even if it could be construed as such, nowhere does it "imply a right or wrong answer or a weak record." In fact, no mention is made of President Reagan in the entire four pages of the Roger Molander letter.

In further support of the assertion that the charges should be dismissed, please note page 4, paragraph 6, of the letter which emphasizes the uniform and even treatment of the nuclear war issue, which has been our long-standing guide. In fact, until this NCPAC charge, our "...deliberately nonpartisan/non-advocacy program..." has never been challenged.


The letter is an invocation to the recipient to (1) involve him/herself in the political process in order to participate in decision-making in those decisions that will affect his/her own future, but to do so from a position of greater information than he/she now possesses; and (2) to contribute to an organization that will educate others to do the same.

This letter was mailed to potential contributors in the spring of 1984. The last mail date was early in March, 1984, at a time when only the Democratic Presidential nomination was contested.

In sum, there are no grounds for the charges and we urge immediate dismissal.

We have deferred a decision on the matter of appointing a general counsel, not only because we do not believe the charges against Ground Zero are serious enough to warrant such a move, but also because the organization is without the resources to pay one.

Sincerely,



Earl A. Molander

for
GROUND ZERO
Post Office Box 19329
Portland, Oregon 97209

85040512081

Earl A. Molander
GROUND ZERO
Post Office Box 19329
Portland, Oregon 97208

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
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Mr. Matthew Gerson
Federal Election Commission
Washington, DC 20463





FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, DC 20463

MEMORANDUM

TO: Office of the Commission Secretary

FROM: Office of General Counsel *QCK*

DATE: October 18, 1984

SUBJECT: MUR 1803 - Memo to COMEM

The attached is submitted as an Agenda document
for the Commission Meeting of _____

Open Session _____

Closed Session _____

CIRCULATIONS

48 Hour Tally Vote	[]
Sensitive	[]
Non-Sensitive	[]
24 Hour No Objection	[]
Sensitive	[]
Non-Sensitive	[]
Information	[]
Sensitive	[]
Non-Sensitive	[]

Other [x]

SENSITIVE

Circulate on Pink Paper

24 Hour Tally

DISTRIBUTION

Compliance	[x]
Audit Matters	[]
Litigation	[]
Closed MUR Letters	[]
Status Sheets	[]
Advisory Opinions	[]
Other (see distribution below)	[]



FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE FEC
COMM. SECRETARY

84 OCT 18 A9:41

October 18, 1984

MEMORANDUM TO: The Commission
FROM: Charles N. Steele
By: Kenneth A. Gross
Associate General Counsel
SUBJECT: MUR 1803 - Ground Zero

SENSITIVE

The National Conservative Political Action Committee alleges that the Ground Zero violated 2 U.S.C. § 441d. That statute requires that:

Whenever any person makes an expenditure for the purpose of financing communications expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate or solicits any contribution... through general public political advertising...

the Communication must indicate who paid for it, and where required, who authorized such communication.

The issues presented are whether the communication expressly advocated Ronald Reagan's defeat and whether the communication solicited contributions for the purpose of influencing a federal election. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i). While the respondent's communication criticized the Reagan administration, it did not expressly advocate Reagan's defeat. However, while Ground Zero definitely solicited contributions in order to advocate positions contrary to those of the Administration, it is uncertain whether the language utilized fell within the statute's purview. It will, therefore, be necessary for the Commission to review the communication's pertinent language before rendering a reason to believe determination.

In addition, we are unable to discern the respondent organization's corporate structure at this time. Because § 441b violations may be involved, we will wait until the fifteen day response period expires before providing the Commission with a complete analysis of this allegation.

85040512081



FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463

October 12, 1984

SPECIAL DELIVERY
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

Roger C. Molander
Executive Director
Ground Zero
806 15th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005

RE: MUR 1803

Dear Mr. Molander:

This letter is to notify you that on October 5, 1984, the Federal Election Commission received a complaint which alleges that you and Ground Zero violated certain sections of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended ("the Act"). A copy of the complaint is enclosed. We have numbered this matter MUR 1803. Please refer to this number in all future correspondence.

Under the Act, you have the opportunity to demonstrate in writing, that no action should be taken against you and Ground Zero in connection with this matter. You may respond to the allegations made against you within 15 days of receipt of this letter. The complaint may be dismissed by the Commission prior to receipt of the response if the alleged violations are not under the jurisdiction of the Commission or if the evidence submitted does not indicate that a violation of the Act has been committed. Should the Commission dismiss the complaint, you and Ground Zero will be notified by mailgram. If no response is filed within the 15 day statutory requirement, the Commission may take further action based on available information.

You are encouraged to respond to this notification promptly. In order to facilitate an expeditious response to this notification, we have enclosed a pre-addressed, postage paid, special delivery envelope.

Please submit any factual or legal materials which you believe are relevant to the Commission's analysis of this matter. Where appropriate, statements should be submitted under oath.

33040512085

This matter will remain confidential in accordance with 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(4)(B) and § 437g(a)(12)(A) unless you notify the Commission, in writing, that you wish the matter to be made public.

If you intend to be represented by counsel in this matter, please advise the Commission by sending a letter of representation stating the name, address and telephone number of such counsel, and a statement authorizing such counsel to receive any notifications and other communications from the Commission.

If you have any questions, please contact Matthew Gerson, the staff person assigned to this matter at (202) 523-4143.

Sincerely,

Charles N. Steele
General Counsel

Kenneth A. Gross (2/7)
By: Kenneth A. Gross
Associate General Counsel

Enclosures
Complaint
Procedures
Envelope

35040512086



FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463

October 12, 1984

CERTIFIED MAIL
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

John T. Dolan
National Chairman
National Conservative
Political Action Committee
1001 Prince Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22314

Dear Mr. Dolan:

This letter is to acknowledge receipt of your complaint which we received on October 5, 1984, against Roger C. Molander and Ground Zero which alleges violations of the Federal Election Campaign laws. A staff member has been assigned to analyze your allegations. The respondent(s) will be notified of this complaint within 24 hours. You will be notified as soon as the Commission takes final action on your complaint. Should you have or receive any additional information in this matter, please forward it to this Office. For your information, we have attached a brief description of the Commission's procedures for handling complaints.

Please be advised that this matter shall remain confidential in accordance with 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(B) and § 437g(a)(12)(A) unless the respondent notifies the Commission in writing that they wish the matter to be made public.

Sincerely,

Charles N. Steele
General Counsel

By: *Kenneth A. Gross (KAG)*
Kenneth A. Gross
Associate General Counsel

Enclosure

35040512087

*National Conservative
Political Action Committee*

*1001 Prince Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22314*

RECEIVED AT THE FEC
GCC # 5006
84 OCT 5 AM: 38

*John T. Dolan
National Chairman*

(703) 684-1800

September 28, 1984

MUR

1803

General Counsel
Federal Election Commission
1325 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20463

Dear Sir:

This letter constitutes a complaint filed pursuant to 2 U.S.C. 437g by the National Conservative Political Action Committee ("NCPAC"), a registered independent political action committee, against Ground Zero, or Ground Zero Fund, Inc. ("GZ"), which has apparently violated the provisions of 2 U.S.C. 441d in making expenditures for the purpose of financing communications which expressly advocate the defeat of Ronald Reagan.

Attached hereto and made a part of this complaint is a copy of a direct mailing produced by GZ which violates 2 U.S.C. 441d. The name and address of the recipient of the mailing have been excised; no other alterations to the mailing have been made.

NCPAC has reason to believe that this communication was mailed to the general public.

NCPAC has reviewed the records of the Commission and ascertained that GZ is not a registered political action committee.

The lack of an outright admonition to vote against President Reagan in the upcoming Presidential election does not defeat the clear intent and purpose of GZ in advocating the defeat of President Reagan as set forth in the enclosed direct mailing.

NCPAC notes that by AO 1984-14, the Commission ruled that a membership organization which compiled voter guides may not distribute such material to the general public if they imply a right or wrong answer or a weak record. In that same advisory


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Federal Election Commission
September 28, 1984
Page Two

opinion it was noted that favoring one candidate over the other in the context of an election indicates an election-influencing purpose.

Very truly yours,

NATIONAL CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL
ACTION COMMITTEE

By: 
John T. Dolan, Chairman

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA)
CITY OF ALEXANDRIA) to-wit:

Sworn to before me this 1st day of ^{October}~~September~~, 1984,
by JOHN T. DOLAN, as Chairman of National Conservative Political
Action Committee, under the penalty of perjury and subject to the
provisions of section 1001 of Title 118 of the United States
Code.


Notary Public

My Commission Expires: 11/21/86

85040512033

806 15th Street, N.W.,



Washington, D.C. 20005

Dear Friend,

Do you think that going from 0 to 50,000 nuclear weapons in the world in 37 years is a human success story?

Do you think that expansion of the "Nuclear Club" from a half dozen nations today to perhaps twenty by the end of the century will make you and your family safer?

Do you think that one summit meeting between the presidents of the United States and the Soviet Union in the last eight years gives us much hope for reigning in the nuclear arms race?

Neither do I.

Do you think that bringing the energy, common sense, and "can-do" attitude of the American people to bear on the problem of nuclear war will help us -- as a nation and as the dominant species on this planet -- to find a new path away from the devastation of nuclear war?

So do I.

So would Daniel Webster, were he still around. That great American statesman rightly proclaimed:

Nothing will ruin the country if the people themselves undertake its safety, and nothing can save it if they leave it in any hands but their own.

The terrible jeopardy in which we find our nation today is unquestionably in part the result of "the people" -- the sensible citizens of the United States -- having left their security exclusively in the hands of others for far too long.

... in the hands of a succession of U.S. presidents who promised us safety and then yielded to the conventional wisdom of their appointed advisors.

... in the hands, therefore, of a narrow community of national security experts whose unquestioning adherence to the centuries-old strategy of "if you hit me, you're gonna be sorry" has led us into a game of suicidal leapfrog with the Russians (whose experts are no more far-sighted than our own).

As you probably suspect, there is no single simple route out of our current dilemma -- but if American citizens will apply their survival instinct and common sense, this nation can

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forge a fundamentally new path away from the precipice of nuclear war.

In Webster's own words, we the people must take our safety back into our own hands after nearly four decades. Call it the Second American Revolution.

With your help, Ground Zero can make it happen. We have a concrete, well thought-out program for turning this nation -- and this whole beleaguered planet -- away from nuclear war.

During the seven years I worked on strategic nuclear weapons policy on the National Security Council staff at the White House, I saw first-hand how haphazardly critical national policies -- policies which affect the survival of my children -- are made.

That's why I founded Ground Zero.

I saw what was missing in the Government's process for setting policies relating to nuclear war, and I saw that the path to safety lies in making our American democracy work as it was meant to.

Thomas Jefferson wrote the prescription:

I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not take it from them, but to inform their discretion by education.

The language is quaint, but the message is pure Nuclear Age. This architect of the first American Revolution put his confidence in the innate wisdom of the broad spectrum of Americans. He felt that once we understand the realities of a problem, our good sense will lead us to a consensus on a solution -- a solution that will work.

I agree. Helping "the people" understand the realities of the nuclear war issue is what Ground Zero is about. It is a critical role, and one that requires your full support if we are to reach enough Americans to make a difference when it really counts: in the 1984 presidential elections.

Even as I write, Ground Zero activists are hard at work in the early primary states, empowering citizens to take their safety back into their own hands. This critical effort--helping people master the nuclear war issue and make our democratic system responsive--will continue across the country right through Election Day.

Between the program our nationwide grassroots network is running with and our new book, HOPE: FACING THE MUSIC ON NUCLEAR WAR IN THE 1984 ELECTIONS, we will make sure that the 1984 election campaign is an experience unprecedented in American electoral history.

At every campaign stop, candidates will be challenged on all aspects of their program to prevent nuclear war--including their

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approach to U.S.-Soviet relations, the overriding issue in reducing the threat of a "day after"--by people who know enough to ask tough questions and demand concrete, straightforward answers.

No evasion, no inconsistency, no simplistic "panacea," no glib promise, no unrealistic proposal will go unchallenged.

Every serious presidential candidate will discover that political success depends on a willingness to describe a thoughtful and coherent comprehensive national strategy for preventing nuclear war.

In other words, the 1984 presidential election can be made a virtual citizens' referendum on the best approach to preventing nuclear war.

You probably think that goal sounds pretty ambitious, but if you will join us in this most important of human enterprises, we can make it happen.

We have to make it happen. If 1984 is "business as usual" in American politics -- with empty rhetoric and the manipulation of issues by the candidates -- we are going to end up with nuclear war policy as usual for four more years.

You might wonder at this point what makes Ground Zero think we can bring the number and diversity of Americans to confront this issue that will make the critical difference in 1984.

Well, here's what we've accomplished so far:

- o In 1982, we got over a million Americans to actively "take on" the nuclear war issue through direct participation in Ground Zero Week educational events in over 650 cities and towns nationwide. The media responded with substantive coverage of the issue, as well as the Week, that helped educate at least 50 million more citizens.
- o Our 1982 primer, NUCLEAR WAR: WHAT'S IN IT FOR YOU?, has sold well over 300,000 copies and is still going strong.
- o Church, civic, high school, college, and ad hoc groups in over 2,000 U.S. communities played our innovative Firebreaks War/Peace Game in 1983. Participants gained a solid understanding of how--and how easily--an international crisis could slide into nuclear conflict. More important, they learned what kinds of U.S. actions and policies can reduce the threat of nuclear war.
- o Our 1983 primer, WHAT ABOUT THE RUSSIANS--AND NUCLEAR WAR?, and a pilot "What about the Russians?" Week educational project confirmed that Americans from across the political spectrum are ready, willing, and able to take on the question of how to deal with the Soviet Union. (Now, if we can only get the presidential candidates to do the same....)
- o On November 21, 1983, Ground Zero's Viewing Guide helped millions of Americans turn the trauma of "The Day After" into a positive learning experience on the prevention of nuclear war.

(over, please)

And that, as they say, is just for starters.

The 1984 election campaign will be a critical test of our ability to decide, as a nation, which strategies for survival in the Nuclear Age are most promising. To make those decisions thoughtfully--and we can't afford to do otherwise--we must demand that each of the candidates submit for our examination a concrete, coherent, and comprehensive set of policies for preventing nuclear war.

Orchestrating that demand, and giving it substance and structure, are the goals of Ground Zero's major 1984 programs.

- o Aggressive promotion of our revised Firebreaks War/Peace Game is bringing a wide variety of groups into the nuclear war issue with a vehicle that is fascinating as well as educational.
- o The insights gained in the game will prepare citizens to join our activists in a full range of 1984 election projects--voter and media briefings on the "firebreak" issues, candidate forums, and Ground Zero's national grassroots Election Connection.

All these projects are aimed at forming a large and diverse "critical mass" of Americans who demand straight talk from the candidates before they vote.

Let's put it this way: A full-scale nuclear war today would kill at least 140,000,000 Americans--Republicans and Democrats, liberals and conservatives, independents and people who never vote at all. That makes preventing nuclear war everybody's business.

So, Ground Zero's deliberately nonpartisan/non-advocacy program is also everybody's business. As millions of Americans are discovering, the facts of nuclear war speak persuasively for themselves.

But make no mistake. What we are talking about is indeed a revolution--millions upon millions of citizens saying, in effect, "I'm scared, and 1984 is the year I help turn things around."

This revolution is going to take everyone's help, and right now I am asking for yours. Ground Zero will make a difference this year --how big a difference will depend in part on your support.

Sincerely,

Roger G. Molander
Roger G. Molander
Executive Director

P.S. Given Ground Zero's education mission, I would be remiss in seeking your support without giving you an opportunity to learn more about the nuclear war issue yourself. I am pleased, therefore, to offer our primer, NUCLEAR WAR: WHAT'S IN IT FOR YOU? to all contributors of \$25 or more.

I think you'll find this book readable, informative and very helpful in ordering the welter of facts associated with the nuclear war issue. By supporting Ground Zero and becoming especially well informed on the issue, you'll be contributing to the prevention of nuclear war in two critical ways. Please act now.

*In nuclear jargon, Ground Zero is the point where a nuclear weapon is detonated.
In survival jargon, it marks a beginning.
We should, we must, make it the first step on the way back from the edge.*

—Judy Mann
The Washington Post

Dear Roger Molander:

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☐ \$15

☒ \$25*

☐ \$50

☐ \$100

☐ Other \$ _____

*For membership contributions of \$25 or more Ground Zero will send you **NUCLEAR WAR: WHAT'S IN IT FOR YOU?**, an essential book for every concerned American who wants the clear, unbiased facts about nuclear war.

IN A DEMOCRACY, PREVENTING NUCLEAR WAR IS *EVERYBODY'S* BUSINESS

I would also like to get involved in Ground Zero activities in my community. Please send me information on:

☐ FIREBREAKS II: A War-Peace Game

☐ Ground Zero's program for making the 1984 presidential election a virtual citizens referendum on a comprehensive U.S. strategy for preventing nuclear war.

Home Area Code/Phone Number

Work Area Code/Phone Number

GROUND ZERO • 806 15th Street, N.W., Suite 421 • Washington, D.C. 20005

85040512094

If you think nuclear war-related decisions "at the top" are made by national mature "grown-ups," I suggest you read this tale of my experience.
R.M.

How I Learned to Start Worrying and Hate the Bomb

By Roger Molander

I WAS INTRODUCED to nuclear war in the mid-1950s, hiding under my school desk during civil defense drills, hoping the Russian bombers would never come. It never crossed my mind then that I would someday be working on nuclear strategy at the White House, hoping still that nuclear war would never come — and realizing how easily it might.

I came to Washington in the 1950s to work for a defense think tank, and within a few months I found myself at an Acheson-Sorensen conference, sitting in a Holiday Inn bar listening to war stories. Nuclear war stories. That's part of the nuclear trade — making fun of yourselves, trying to find ways not to take yourself too seriously, even having a good time now and then.

My favorite tale that night was about Rarotonga, a dreamy island in the South Pacific. For several months in the early 1950s it was an outpost for a two-man crew manning a radar that observed atmospheric weapons tests, clearly a hardship assignment. The men's only contact with civilization was a weekly supply plane, which kept breaking down on the island.

In fact, it broke down so often that the regional military commander sent a special mission force to find out what was up. The special mission discovered that Rarotonga was a Polynesian paradise with lush tropical fruits and affectionate maidens straight out of a Gipsy painting. Rarotonga was taken off the hardship duty list.

Within a year or so, my think-tank studies of weapons effects gave way to studies of the weapons themselves and to communications systems and missile warning systems. Then came nuclear "exchange" calculations: our missiles against their missiles, their missiles against our bombers, their subs against our bombers — endless combinations.

There were no people involved in these "exchanges," only calculations. It was a curious fiction, never discussing the humans at the military installations or the industries or the cities. I guess that made it easier on the targeters in Omaha, the people there in charge of launching the missiles or the bombers, and the analysts like me.

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Roger Molander, former nuclear strategist for the White House's National Security Council, now is executive director of "Ground Zero," a nuclear war education project.



By Steve Meyerson - The Washington Post

NUCLEAR, From Page D1

I recall one Saturday a colleague came into the think tank office with his wife to find me sticking different-colored pins — representing different-sized weapons — into a map of the Soviet Union. Add a pink pin for Minsk — another 300,000 dead. My colleague's wife was horrified. But when the pin went into Minsk or Moscow, I didn't see people working or children playing. I assumed that someone above me in the system thought about those things. I just stuck in the pins.

In 1980, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) began, and I found myself trying to find the combinations of weapons limitations and verification provisions that would be acceptable to us and our allies as well as to the places where the pins were being stuck. At first bluish the problem looked easy to me. But an older colleague told me I had a lot to learn. He was, of course, correct.

Within a month I had met the first of a small but not unimportant community of people who violently opposed SALT for a simple reason: It might keep America from developing a first-strike capability against the Soviet Union. I'll never forget being lectured by an Air Force colonel about how we should have "nuked" the Soviets in the late 1940s before they got The Bomb. I was told that if SALT would go away, we'd soon have the capability to nuke them again — and this time we'd use it.

As the SALT negotiations began in earnest, I dug into studies at the think tank for the Pentagon — and immediately came face to face with the ultimate questions of the nuclear war trade: How much is enough? What is the "threshold of pain" for the Soviet decision-makers? What level of destruction will deter Soviet attack? Is it measured in industrial capacity? In war machines? In Soviet citizenry? In some arcane combination of these and other factors which a careful reading of Russian history and of recent articles in *Red Star* would divine?

My rite of passage was complete. The scientist — whose main interest in graduate school was trying to obtain commercially useful energy from controlled fusion — had become the policy analyst playing nuclear war. The policy analyst went to the White House.

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I was at the White House's National Security Council only a few months when it was time for a SALT negotiating session to begin in Geneva. One of Secretary of State Kissinger's division heads asked me to draft a set of instructions for the American delegation. I asked what to put in the instructions — and was told just to do a draft on my own, with one cover memo to Kissinger and another from Kissinger to the president.

Three days later I got the package and the instructions back. The person who had asked for the draft had not changed a word. Nor had Kissinger. Nor had the president. The instructions were on their way to Geneva. I swallowed hard.

Those people above me who were supposed to be thinking about the Big Questions were

relying on me to think about those things. I was to make decisions in the nuclear war trade, not just stick in pins. So I began to think about many things.

I thought about the fact that nobody else around the White House seemed to understand nuclear war issues better than I did; knowing my limitations, that did not reassure me. I thought about the organizational chaos at the White House, the haphazard way decisions often were reached. I thought about the minimum amount of time the president had to spend on nuclear war issues, his ultimate responsibility. I thought about the former presidential science advisor, similarly struck by the way major decisions are made, who asked, "Where are the grown-ups?"

His comment is apt. There is a good deal of childish behavior in the White House, including temper tantrums. The last place I expected to find adults losing control of themselves was in White House rooms with nuclear war planners. But there the tantrums were — directed at officials of other countries, at briefing books, at staff, at other high U.S. officials, at almost anything you can think of. I had hoped that the White House's nuclear war business was in the hands of people who were rational and calm under pressure. I was learning.

In time I learned to live with all of this. But to friends — who asked questions like "Not going to get blown up soon, are we?" — I confided that it was the ultimate example of "in the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king." Many thought I was joking. I wasn't.

As the shock of these experiences wore off, I joined with some of the most dedicated people I have ever met in trying to help the president perform the hardest job in the world. I watched three presidents who were deeply concerned about the problem of preventing nuclear war leave the White House with a sense of frustration. Each sought to leave the American people with a legacy of security with respect to nuclear war, a confidence that nuclear war would not happen. Each failed.

I felt that some sense of frustration and failure, especially in early 1980, when the struggle to save SALT II and the work of three administrations ended with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. I had expected to spend the first few months of 1980 carrying the case for the treaty — "modest, but useful," in the words of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — to the Senate floor. I knew it would be a real challenge: I had discovered that most of the senators on the Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees — those making critical decisions, to say nothing of endless speeches — lacked even a rudimentary understanding of the nuclear war business.

When SALT II was defeated, I had some time to ponder how we had gotten ourselves into the awful mess we were in.

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The factor that stood out in my mind was

Start Worrying and Hate the Bomb

the seeming lack of understanding of just how great the chance of nuclear war really was.

I had seen how the White House and the so-called chain of command operated — and assumed the Russians were probably worse. I knew how poorly we understood the Russians — and how poorly they understood us. I could see the rising problem of nuclear proliferation vastly increasing the risk of superpower confrontation.

Adding it all up was unsettling. There was altogether too much opportunity for machine error, for human error, for errors in judgment. Nuclear war could occur far more easily than people in the White House, in Congress and in the country at large seemed to realize.

In Thomas Pynchon's prize-winning novel "Gravity's Rainbow," two of the major figures, a statistician and a Pavlovian psychologist, debate the driving force behind human events. The statistician claims it's mostly random and unpredictable — a lot of balls bouncing off each other governed primarily by the laws of probability. The Pavlovian argues for a world dominated by cause and effect, stimulus and response. I vote with the statistician.

If nuclear war comes and any historians survive, they will marvel at the role of chance in its genesis, its escalation, its grim conclusion.

Some chance events — which have taken us closer to the brink than is realized — have of course already occurred. There was the mid-1980s incident in which U.S. radar mistook the rising of the moon for a missile attack. There was the 1979 mishap in which a computer with a practice Soviet missile at-

tack tape on it was accidentally introduced into an operating missile warning system. There was the 1980 accident in which a microchip failed in a computer at Strategic Air Command headquarters in Omaha and the B52s almost took off.

These unintended happenings can be multiplied by presumed mishaps on the Soviet side and by additional mistakes in other nations which have acquired, or are in the process of acquiring, nuclear weapons. It is by no means inconceivable that next time, rather than on a calm day when we and the Soviets are merely at our normal levels of enmity, a false alarm will occur in an atmosphere of crisis, with somebody suddenly heading for the Hot Line and trying to explain that it was just a mistake.

Ah, yes, the Hot Line. How many people know that it's a slow teletype machine, and that its use suffers from the usual problem of getting a good translation? I had witnessed two incidents in the SALT negotiations in which the United States and the Soviet Union had profoundly misunderstood each other in this fashion.

The first was at Vladivostok in 1974, when President Ford and Secretary Kissinger had come home in triumph with an agreement that was found to be no agreement at all when the sides tried to write it down in agreed language. A similar incident took place in the early months of the Carter administration, when an agreement on limiting new types of ICBMs evaporated into thin air over a language disagreement.

What if one of these "misunderstandings" took place in a crisis as the sides tried to control further escalation, rather than in the midst of a seven-year negotiation? In the nuclear war business, we cannot afford to live anything in the translation.

It was also chance that these thoughts coincided with the birth of my second child.

There's something in the birth of a child — or the death of a loved one — that is a reminder of both the miracle and the fragility of life. Now there she was, a new person, a new being, demanding the right to live, to find out "why she came." And here I was, thinking of the risks of nuclear war.

I held forth on all this to a friend late one night when most sensible people have gone home or to bed. I railed away at the absurdity of the situation we Americans found ourselves in — living in an imperfect world with imperfect machines and imperfect people making decisions on subjects they only partially understood. Something had to be done.

Clearly, at the root of the problem is that the public has scarcely any reliable information with which to develop thoughtful opinions about American nuclear policy. Policymakers, therefore, have little serious sense of public opinion to guide them.

Sure, there are polls on the nuclear ques-

tion. But nowhere do these polls tell us about the difficult decisions and trade-offs involved. We know from polls, for example, that two-thirds of the nation wants to pursue arms control with the Soviet Union — and that at the same time two-thirds doesn't trust the Russians to adhere to such accords. Do Americans, therefore, want arms control negotiations or not? The polls, in their simplicity, have been part of the problem.

A larger part of the problem is that no effort has been made by the government to maintain public concern and understanding about the fundamental questions of nuclear war. Perhaps this is understandable. What president is going to send a message to the nation that he and his colleagues are losing their grip on the nuclear war issue? Public interest groups have made some effort, but they are small, uncoordinated, often suspected of being "unfunded lefties," and expend most of their energy in Washington.

It was clear that something was wrong, that the link between policymakers in Washington and the people we served was far too weak. We didn't understand their fears and frustrations; they didn't understand the complicated nature of our decisions. Only by providing careful and thorough information to public and to officials can we avoid the ignorance we often find on both the outside belt and right.

My interest in doing something about all this wound as daily life took over again — until chance intervened once more in the form of the obscure attempt to rescue the American hostages held in Iran in April 1980.

The day after the raid, as we waited to see how the Iranians would react and what fate held in store for the hostages, I encountered a friend, a general, in the halls of the Old Executive Office Building. We both knew all too well that the favorite Pentagon war game scenario for the start of World War III was a crisis in Iran. Now we had one. What if the Iranians killed the hostages? What would the Russians do if we retaliated?

We talked about the uncertainties, and as the conversation drew to a close, he said, "You know, I called my kids last night." He hesitated and then continued, "I never call my kids." His kids were grown up, and I knew what he was saying: Was this it?

The final chance event that pushed my determination to help correct our situation involved another military officer. It happened at a meeting in the Pentagon when a Navy captain offered the view that people in this country and Europe were getting much too excited about the consequences of nuclear war. He argued that people were talking as if nuclear war would be the end of the world when, in fact, only 300 million people would be killed.

Only 300 million people. I remember repeating it to myself: Only 300 million people.


Then he went on to argue that within a generation, genetic engineering would make people immune to radiation. I reached for my hat, suddenly knowing how Woody Allen felt in "Annie Hall" when he argued himself from a conversation with the plan that he had "an appointment back on planet Earth."




Roger Molander

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
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